12542ecb19
Pocket ID replaces Forgejo as the OIDC provider for Outline, Vaultwarden and NetBird; Forgejo logs in through it. Uptime Kuma sits behind tinyauth via Caddy forward_auth (group ops), the public status page stays public. offboarding/offboard.py switches one person off in every service with an API and prints what a human still has to do: the shared passwords they could read. Measured: SSO lock alone left 10 of 13 ways open for 45 minutes; the script leaves 1 of 14, the vault copy on their laptop. HARDENING.md: the ufw hairpin that broke Vaultwarden SSO and Kuma, the mesh route into the docker bridges, and a fail2ban exception for Pocket ID.
78 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
78 lines
3.7 KiB
Markdown
# Offboarding (episode 15)
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Someone leaves. Switching them off in the single sign-on is not offboarding.
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Measured on the demo box, with a test employee who had the access a real one has:
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| After | Ways still open |
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| --- | --- |
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| Forgejo login prohibited (Forgejo was the SSO provider) | **10 of 13**, unchanged for 45 minutes |
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| Pocket ID account disabled, nothing else | **12 of 14** |
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| `./offboard.py <user>` (about one second) | **1 of 14**: the vault copy on their laptop |
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What stayed open with only the SSO switched off: the wiki session (valid for
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three months) and its API key, the vault sync (Forgejo kept handing out fresh
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tokens to the locked account), a new vault login with the master password, the
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local vault copy, the mesh peer (expires after 24 h), the automation account,
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both notification logins, and the monitoring password everybody knows.
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## Run it
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On the box, as root:
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```sh
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cd /opt/selfhostedops-stack/offboarding
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cp offboard.env.example offboard.env && chmod 600 offboard.env # fill in once
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./offboard.py sam --dry-run # looks, changes nothing
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./offboard.py sam
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```
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It disables the person in Pocket ID first (no new logins, refresh tokens
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refused), then per service: deletes the tinyauth gate sessions, prohibits the
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Forgejo login and deletes the SSH keys, suspends the Outline user, disables the
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Vaultwarden user (which also logs out every device), deletes the NetBird user
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with its peers, deletes the n8n user, deletes the ntfy user with its tokens.
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Every step can run twice. A step that fails says why and the others still run.
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Then it prints what only a human can do. The important line is this one:
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```
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Vaultwarden: remove the user from organization 'Northwind Labs' (needs an org
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owner) and CHANGE THE 6 SHARED PASSWORDS they could read. A copy on their
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laptop still opens with their master password, offline, forever.
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```
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That is not a figure of speech. After the script, on the test laptop, with the
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network namespace cut off, `bw unlock` still opened all six shared entries in
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clear text. No server-side switch reaches a file on someone else's disk.
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Rotation is the offboarding step for everything they could read.
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## What the keys in offboard.env may do
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| Key | Scope | Why |
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| --- | --- | --- |
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| `POCKET_ID_API_KEY` | admin API, set an expiry | disable the user |
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| `FORGEJO_ADMIN_TOKEN` | `write:admin`, `write:user` | prohibit login, delete keys, list tokens |
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| `OUTLINE_API_KEY` | an admin's key | suspend |
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| `NETBIRD_PAT` | service user, role admin, 30 days | delete user and peers |
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| `N8N_API_KEY` | only `user:list`, `user:read`, `user:delete` | delete the user |
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This file is the most powerful thing on the box after root. Keep it at 600,
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give every key an expiry, and renew them on purpose.
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## Traps we hit while building it
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- **Vaultwarden admin routes want JSON.** `POST /admin/users/<id>/disable`
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without a JSON content type is not a 403, it is a 404, and it looks exactly
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like "user not found".
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- **Vaultwarden rate-limits the admin login** (a handful per five minutes). Two
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test runs back to back and the third one gets 429. The script says so.
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- **An old n8n API key cannot delete users.** Keys created before scopes
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existed, or with the wrong ones, get 403. Create one with `user:delete`.
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- **Forgejo tokens:** an admin can list a user's tokens (`Sudo:` header) but
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deleting one needs the owner's password. `prohibit_login` blocks them, so the
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script names them instead.
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- **Outline 1.10** lists an admin only their own API keys. Suspending the user
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refuses their keys and browser sessions anyway (measured: 401 and 403).
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- **Group restriction in Pocket ID is a separate switch.** Setting allowed
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groups on a client via the API leaves `isGroupRestricted` false, and the UI
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then says "Any user can sign in to this client". Set both.
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