88670f028f
Measured on the demo box against the same 24h of real traffic. Episode 12 (detection, blocklist, firewall): - crowdsec/ with install notes and the traps: port 8080 clash, empty first blocklist pull, replay forensic-mode dropping events (FIFO workaround), ssh-time-based-bf shipping remediation:false, the AppSec collections that refuse to start without extra rules. - firewall bouncer in nftables mode (input + forward), which blocks Docker-published ports and survives ufw reload; iptables/DOCKER-USER does not. - HARDENING.md episode 12 section with the numbers: fail2ban 4 banned IPs vs CrowdSec 23 detected / 1 blocked, blocklist overlap 50% of IPs but 19% of attempts, and the mode=normal blind spot for key-only root attempts. Episode 13 (AppSec WAF): - caddy/Dockerfile now builds the CrowdSec bouncer and AppSec handler alongside rate-limit, pinned to v0.14.1. - Caddyfile imports a crowdsec snippet (bouncer + appsec) on every site except vpn; compose passes CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_KEY and host.docker.internal. - Measured: virtual patching blocks known CVEs only (7 of 41 probes, near-zero false positives); OWASP CRS raises that to 27 of 41 but breaks git push and wiki editing at default paranoia. Default stays vpatch+generic. fail2ban config unchanged. No secrets or real domains/IPs in tracked files.
86 lines
3.8 KiB
Text
86 lines
3.8 KiB
Text
# ~$ selfhostedops — copy me: cp .env.example .env
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# Generate secrets with: openssl rand -hex 32
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# Your base domain. Services live at git.* wiki.* vault.* status.* ntfy.* vpn.*
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# DNS: one wildcard A (and AAAA) record *.ops.example.com -> your server IP
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DOMAIN=ops.example.com
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# Let's Encrypt notifications + expiry mails
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ACME_EMAIL=you@example.com
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TZ=Europe/Berlin
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# --- Outline ---
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OUTLINE_PG_PASSWORD=CHANGE_ME_openssl_rand_hex_32
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OUTLINE_SECRET_KEY=CHANGE_ME_openssl_rand_hex_32
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OUTLINE_UTILS_SECRET=CHANGE_ME_openssl_rand_hex_32
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# From Forgejo: Site Administration -> Applications -> OAuth2
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# Redirect URI: https://wiki.<DOMAIN>/auth/oidc.callback
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OUTLINE_OIDC_CLIENT_ID=
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OUTLINE_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# --- Vaultwarden ---
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# Admin panel token (argon2 hash recommended, plain string works to start)
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VAULTWARDEN_ADMIN_TOKEN=CHANGE_ME_openssl_rand_hex_32
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# Flip to false once your team has signed up:
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VAULTWARDEN_SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true
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# Single sign-on against your own Forgejo (episode 4).
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# From Forgejo: Site Administration -> Applications -> OAuth2 Application
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# Redirect URI must be EXACTLY: https://vault.<DOMAIN>/identity/connect/oidc-signin
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VAULTWARDEN_SSO_CLIENT_ID=
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VAULTWARDEN_SSO_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# --- wg-easy (optional, --profile vpn) ---
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# Generate with: docker run --rm ghcr.io/wg-easy/wg-easy wgpw 'yourpassword'
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WGEASY_PASSWORD_HASH=
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# --- CI (episode 2, optional: docker compose --profile ci up -d) ---
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# One shared secret registers the runner declaratively. Generate it with:
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# openssl rand -hex 20
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# Then derive the UUID Forgejo will know it by:
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# python3 -c 'import uuid,sys;print(uuid.UUID(bytes=sys.argv[1][:16].encode()))' <secret>
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# And register it on the Forgejo side:
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# docker compose exec -u git forgejo forgejo forgejo-cli actions register \
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# --name box-runner --labels docker --secret <secret>
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# A registration token copied from the web UI does NOT work here.
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RUNNER_SECRET=
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RUNNER_UUID=
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# --- ntfy push notifications (episode 6) ---
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# No secrets here: ntfy keeps its users in its own database. Create them once:
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# docker compose exec -e NTFY_PASSWORD=<pw> ntfy ntfy user add --role=user kuma
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# docker compose exec ntfy ntfy access kuma alerts write-only
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# See monitoring/README.md for the full walkthrough.
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# --- n8n automation (episode 8) ---
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# No variables needed here either: the workflows keep their credentials inside
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# n8n, encrypted with the key in /home/node/.n8n/config. That file is inside the
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# n8n_data volume and therefore inside the nightly backup from episode 7.
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#
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# If you would rather pin the key yourself (recommended once more than one
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# person can restore this box), uncomment the line below and put the same value
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# in your password manager. It wins over the file, and the file is then never
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# written. Changing it later makes every existing credential undecryptable.
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# openssl rand -base64 24
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# N8N_ENCRYPTION_KEY=
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#
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# The ntfy user the workflows publish as:
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# docker compose exec -e NTFY_PASSWORD=<pw> ntfy ntfy user add --role=user n8n
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# docker compose exec ntfy ntfy access n8n alerts write-only
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# docker compose exec ntfy ntfy access n8n deploys write-only
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# See automation/README.md for the rest.
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# --- Episode 9: the ops triage agent ---------------------------------------
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# The shared secret between n8n and the ops-actions runner. Anything that can
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# present this header can ask for a container restart, so treat it like a key:
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# openssl rand -hex 24
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# The runner still refuses any action or any target that is not on its own
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# hard-coded allowlists, so a leaked token cannot widen the blast radius.
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OPS_ACTIONS_TOKEN=
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# --- Episode 12: CrowdSec -------------------------------------------------
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# The Caddy bouncer's key for the CrowdSec Local API on the host:
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# cscli bouncers add caddy-bouncer -o raw
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# Without it Caddy still starts, but blocks nothing and logs auth errors.
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CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_KEY=
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