88670f028f
Measured on the demo box against the same 24h of real traffic. Episode 12 (detection, blocklist, firewall): - crowdsec/ with install notes and the traps: port 8080 clash, empty first blocklist pull, replay forensic-mode dropping events (FIFO workaround), ssh-time-based-bf shipping remediation:false, the AppSec collections that refuse to start without extra rules. - firewall bouncer in nftables mode (input + forward), which blocks Docker-published ports and survives ufw reload; iptables/DOCKER-USER does not. - HARDENING.md episode 12 section with the numbers: fail2ban 4 banned IPs vs CrowdSec 23 detected / 1 blocked, blocklist overlap 50% of IPs but 19% of attempts, and the mode=normal blind spot for key-only root attempts. Episode 13 (AppSec WAF): - caddy/Dockerfile now builds the CrowdSec bouncer and AppSec handler alongside rate-limit, pinned to v0.14.1. - Caddyfile imports a crowdsec snippet (bouncer + appsec) on every site except vpn; compose passes CROWDSEC_BOUNCER_KEY and host.docker.internal. - Measured: virtual patching blocks known CVEs only (7 of 41 probes, near-zero false positives); OWASP CRS raises that to 27 of 41 but breaks git push and wiki editing at default paranoia. Default stays vpatch+generic. fail2ban config unchanged. No secrets or real domains/IPs in tracked files.
10 lines
391 B
YAML
10 lines
391 B
YAML
# episode 12: the AppSec (WAF) endpoint the Caddy bouncer asks on every request.
|
|
# Listens on all addresses; ufw only lets the Docker "proxy" network in
|
|
# (see crowdsec/README.md). Needs the appsec collections AND the rules listed
|
|
# in the README, or crowdsec refuses to start.
|
|
appsec_configs:
|
|
- crowdsecurity/appsec-default
|
|
labels:
|
|
type: appsec
|
|
listen_addr: 0.0.0.0:7422
|
|
source: appsec
|